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Cuba is perhaps the country with which the United States has had the
longest lasting troubled relationship. Dating back to the Bay of Pigs and
the Cuban Missile Crisis, the public's response to Cuba is often visceral
and negative. Our response to baseball is similarly visceral and positive.'
Baseball has inspired songs,2 jingles,3 poetry,4 and some of our most be-
loved movies.5 When the relationship with Cuba collides with the sport
that is perhaps our nation's most cherished, the result is bound to be
explosive.
Consider this: our relationship with Cuba in the last decade has in-
cluded the shooting down of civilian aircraft by the Cuban Air Force, the
Helms-Burton Act which tried to expand the Cuban embargo, and the
Elian Gonzales saga. Yet, at the same time, numerous Cuban baseball
players have made their way to the United States and to Major League
Baseball (MLB).
This article will examine several issues at the intersection of Cuba,
the United States, and baseball. Inevitably, and sometimes unfortu-
nately, dealings with Cuba involve politics. The first part of this article
will examine the broader politics and laws governing the relationship be-
tween the United States and Cuba regarding baseball. This section will
examine the experience of the Baltimore Orioles in their travels to Cuba
to play baseball and their hosting the Cuban National Team in the
United States. This section will also analyze the controversy caused by
the Orioles when they announced that they would not hire Cuban
defectors.
The second part of the article will focus on the narrower issues raised
when Cuban defectors come to the United States and want to play base-
ball. This section will review the history of Cuban player defections to
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. My thanks to Ian
Harper, Eric Runez, and Scott Mielke for their research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Roberto GonzAlez Echevarrfa, The Magic of Baseball, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LE-
GAL STUD. 145 (2000).
2. Take Me Out To The Ball Game.
3. "Baseball, hotdogs, apple pie and Chevrolet." Chevrolet commercial (1970s).
4. Casey At The Bat.
5. E.g., FIELD OF DIEAMs (Universal Studios 1989); BULL DuRHAm (Orion Pictures
1988); THE NATURAL (Columbia Pictures 1984); BAD NEws BEARS (Paramount Pictures
1976).
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the United States and then focus on the recent court case brought by a
Cuban player against Major League Baseball alleging discriminatory
rules regarding free agency.
I. THE BALTIMORE ORIOLES CONTROVERSY
After Cuba's shooting down of two planes carrying United States ci-
vilians6 and the resulting passage of the Helms-Burton law which at-
tempted to restrict trade with Cuba even further,7 relations between the
United States and Cuba were very cold. By 1999, however, relations
with Cuba were thawing in a variety of ways. Congress had passed sev-
eral bills that ostensibly relaxed the embargo with Cuba.8 The Elian
Gonzales controversy may have helped to ease relations in the long run
by generating sympathy for Elian's Cuban father who wanted to take
him home.9 And in 1999, the thaw continued as the Clinton administra-
tion gave permission to the Baltimore Orioles to play baseball in Cuba.1"
One of the key problems with United States teams playing in Cuba
and vice versa was money." Due to United States law prohibiting trade
with Cuba,12 profits from the game in Baltimore could not go to the
Cuban government. Resolving this controversy took flexibility and inge-
nuity on the part of the State Department; the parties finally agreed that
the money would go to a Cuban agency. 13
6. Matthew N. Greller, Note and Comment, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your
Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major
League Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1647, 1649 n.3
(1999).
7. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton
Act) §§ 102, 201, 301, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6032, 6061, 6081 (Supp. V 1999); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act: Congress and Cuba:
The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 423 (1996). Both the Clinton and Bush admin-
istrations continue not to enforce the most onerous parts of this law.
8. Tim Weiner, U.S. Ready to Ease Some Restrictions in Policy on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 1999, at A4; see also H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. (2001) (allowing certain materials to be traded
with Cuba, particularly food and medicine).
9. Christopher Marquis, Altered States: A Shift in the U.S.-Cuba Time Warp, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2000, § 4, at 4.
10. Murray Chass, Orioles to Play in Cuba: First Such Trip Since '59, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1999, at D6. The Orioles had requested permission for this exchange for three years before it
was granted.
11. Murray Chass, Deal Is Finally Worked Out for Orioles-Cuba Exhibition, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1999, § 8, at 2.
12. Exec. Order No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 6, 1962) (explaining that President
Kennedy's establishment of a comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba sought to pro-
mote security throughout the western hemisphere); 22 U.S.C. §§ 6032, 6061, 6081.
13. Chass, supra note 11, § 8, at 2.
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In March 1999, the Orioles traveled to Cuba for several games
against the Cuban National Team. The Cuban National Team played the
Orioles in Baltimore that May. The response to this baseball exchange
was interesting for a number of reasons. First, the owner of the Orioles,
Peter Angelos, was accused by other owners of using the games as a
pretext for recruiting Cuban players.14 Second, some baseball players
and politicians criticized the games for giving Castro legitimacy as the
leader of Cuba. 5 Finally, others praised the exchange as a continuation
of the thawing of United States-Cuban relations. 6 The mixed response
to these games reflected the wide variety of viewpoints on dealing with
Cuba.
The reaction to these games also demonstrated how special baseball
is in the eyes of many Americans. While Cuban-American exchanges in
other professions (orchestras, teachers, etc.) had received some notice,' 7
the exchange of baseball teams received wide press coverage. The focus
of this coverage was both regarding the respective quality of the teams' 8
as well as the potential impact that this type of exchange could have on
foreign relations in general. 19 When the games were over, many ex-
pected that this type of exchange would be repeated.20
Undoubtedly with an eye toward continuing these exchanges, the
Orioles Vice-President, Syd Thrift, was quoted by the conservative paper
The Washington Times on May 17, 2000, as stating that the Orioles would
not hire any Cuban defectors in order to maintain good relations with
Castro." Perhaps recognizing the storm to come, Thrift back-peddled
the next day by calling his statement a concept not a policy.22 Baltimore
14. Wire Report, Marlins Owner Rips O's for Playing Cuba, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 27, 1999,
at 5.
15. Murray Chass, Cubans in Majors Opposing Orioles' Trip to Homeland, N.Y. TiMEs,
Mar. 25, 1999, at D3.
16. George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; Cuba Game Could Open Some Doors, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1999, at Dl.
17. Peter Watous, Arts Abroad: Swapping Cha-Chas and Rap in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1999, at El.
18. Richard Justice, Orioles' Extra Effort Pays Off: Baines's Hit in 11th Wins Game in
Cuba, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1999, at Dl; Richard Justice, Orioles Get Smoked By Cubans:
Visitors Collect 18 Hits, Pickering Makes 3 Errors, WASH. POsr, May 4, 1999, at D1.
19. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Ready to Play Ball With Cuba: Clinton to Ease Trade Em-
bargo, Using Orioles as Unofficial Envoys, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1999, at Al.
20. Christopher Marquis, Despite U.S. Restrictions Against Cuba, Door Opens Wider for
Visits by Americans, N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 2000, at A10.
21. Brooke Thnstall, Orioles Won't Make a Pitch for Cuban Defectors; Seek Better U.S.
Relations with Havana, WASH. TimEs, May 17, 2000, at Al.
22. Peter Schmuck, O's Won't Pursue Cuban Defectors: Thrift Says Stance is 'Concept,'
Not Policy, BALT. SUN, May 18, 2000, at 6D.
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Orioles owner Peter Angelos also denied that the comment was Orioles'
policy but added that he did not like how Cuban players were signed in a
"meat market" fashion 23 and that the Orioles did not want to encourage
defections.24 Neither Thrift's nor Angelos's denials were sufficiently ve-
hement to avert the political fallout of such commentary. Thrift naively
lamented to the press that "[T]he trip was supposed to be non-political.
It was supposed to be just baseball. 25
While the Orioles would probably have been subject to the same crit-
icisms by these politicians, the situation was made even more explosive
by the fact that Peter Angelos was a significant contributor to the Demo-
cratic National Committee.26 As the controversy escalated, members of
both sides began throwing their proverbial brush-back pitches. Republi-
can National Committee chairman Jim Nicholson started the accusations
with a press release noting,
The Cubans who flee the brutal regime of Castro's Cuba should
be welcomed to the United States with wide-open arms and all
the opportunities that freedom and capitalism provide. Instead,
Peter Angelos - who sits in the swank owner's box at Camden
yards and is the biggest trial lawyer donor in the country - turns a
blind eye to the atrocities committed by Castro's totalitarian
state.2 7
Within days, Senator Jesse Helms asked the Justice Department to begin
an investigation regarding the Orioles' hiring practices.28 Helms's
spokesman Marc Thiessen commented, "Unfortunately, for Orioles
owner Peter Angelos, being friends in this country with Fidel Castro
doesn't put you above the law."'29 A day after Helms's request, the con-
servative organization Judicial Watch filed an Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) complaint against the Orioles.3" Judicial
23. Eric Fisher, Angelos Denies 'Wild Notion' by Helms on Hiring, WASH. TIMES, May 27,
2000, at Al.
24. George Solomon, Angelos: Orioles Would Sign Cuban Defectors for Team, WASH.
POST, May 19, 2000, at D6; Schmuck, supra note 22, at 60.
25. Schmuck, supra note 22, at 6D.
26. Mark Asher, O's Defector Comments May be Probed, WASH. POsT, May 27, 2000, at
D6.
27. Brooke Tunstall, GOP Slams Angelos on Cuba, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at B5.
28. Eric Fisher and Brooke Tunstall, Justice Probes Orioles' Hiring, WASH. TIMES, July 13,
2000, at Al.
29. Fisher, supra note 23, at Al.
30. Press Release, Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch Files EEOC Complaint Against Balti-
more Orioles Owner Peter Angelos (May 26, 2000) (on file with author).
The Elian Gonzalez and Baltimore Orioles' sagas are very instructive to the American
people. It is now apparent that there are many people in high places in our govern-
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Watch President Tom Fitton stated, "The Orioles have as morally bank-
rupt a position as any racist statement."31
The Orioles, of course, had their own commentary. Orioles owner
Peter Angelos struck back by stating that "Sen. Helms's irresponsible
statement ... establishes him as the best argument for term limits. '32
And the Orioles spokesmen asked, "Hello? We're listening to Jesse
Helms now on issues of race and ethnicity? 33
The controversy, and sniping, continued into June. Republican Con-
gressman Bill Goodling, the chairman of the Education and Workforce
Committee in the House of Representatives wrote to MLB Commis-
sioner Bud Selig requesting that MLB take action against the Orioles.34
Later in June, Senator Helms renewed his request for a review of the
Orioles, this time taking his argument to the EEOC.5 And after a par-
ticularly brutal Orioles loss (19-1) to the Yankees in July, Helms spokes-
man Mark Thiessen remarked that the score was only "further evidence
that the O's fans are the ones paying the price for Mr. Angelos' love
affair with a Cuban dictator...36
The political battle and its accompanying soundbites were far more
amusing than the potential legal violations. By the end of June, three
different organizations were asked to look further into the Orioles hiring
practices: the EEOC, the Senate Committee on Education and the
Workforce, and Major League Baseball. However, even if one assumed
ment and elsewhere who still sympathize with Castro's Communist dictatorship....
And, given the pathetic state of the Orioles, they certainly need all the help they can
get from ex-Cuban baseball players.
&d See also Letter from Larry Klayman, Chairman and General Counsel, Judicial Watch, Inc.,
to Ida L. Castro, Chairman, United States Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission
(May 26, 2000) (on file with author).
31. Michael O'Keeffe, Right-Wingers Say Birds Fly Fidel's Colors, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
June 21, 2000, at 71.
32. Asher, supra note 26, at D6.
33. Fisher, supra note 23, at Al (over the years, Senator Helms, himself, has often been
accused of being racist).
34. Letter from Bill Goodling, Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, to
Allan H. (Bud) Selig, Commissioner, Major League Baseball (June 20, 2000) (on file with
author).
35. Letter from Jesse Helms, Senator, United States Senate, to Ida L. Castro, Chairman,
United States Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission (July 14, 2000) (on file with
author); see also Brooke Tunstall and Eric Fisher, Helms Asks Reno for Orioles Probe, WASH.
TiMns, May 26, 2000, at Al.
36. Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Marc Thiessen,
Hmm.... Maybe Mr. Angelos Could Use Some Cuban Defectors? (July 26,2000) (on file with
author).
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that the Orioles did have a policy of not hiring Cuban defectors, it is
unlikely that the Orioles would even be found guilty in a court of law.
First, the potential legal violations that the Orioles were charged with
fell primarily under Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of national origin.37 Title VII applies primarily to citizens, but Cuban
defectors are not citizens. Instead, when the Cuban players arrive in the
United States, they are legal residents who are automatically granted
refugee status.38 Therefore, the rights of Cuban ballplayers would pri-
marily be protected under the Immigration and Reform Control Act
(IRCA).3 9 As IRCA is silent on a number of crucial elements required
to prove discrimination, it is unclear how a court would interpret the
Orioles alleged policy. When a defendant can show dual or mixed mo-
tives for discrimination, these motives may limit damages under the cur-
rent Title VII40 or even defeat liability if previous Title VII cases are
used as the standard.41 In this case, the Orioles explanation of not want-
ing to encourage defections or even a claim that the Orioles could not
afford or utilize certain Cuban ballplayers would serve as a permissible
motive. Furthermore, without an individual plaintiff to claim damages
against the Orioles, the Justice Department would have at most asked
for a declaratory judgment against the team.
Secondly, the current Supreme Court interprets the definition of
state actor very narrowly.42 It is unlikely that even earlier cases finding
discrimination against MLB in other areas would be decided in the same
way today. For example, Ludtke v. Kuhn43 held that women could not
be barred from dressing rooms. This case was based on finding that sta-
diums were public accommodations.44 However, under today's narrow
interpretation for state actor, this case might be decided differently.
Finally, baseball has always received special treatment in the courts
even compared to other sports. This has been demonstrated both by the
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
38. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transi-
tion Cuba, 16 BERK. J. INT'L L. 234 (1998); Matthew A. Pingeton, United States Immigration
Policy: Detaining Cuban Refugees Taken from the Sea, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 329
(1999).
39. Immigration and Reform Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(a)(1) (1994).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that a defendant may
avoid a finding of liability by proving through a preponderance of the evidence that they
would have made the same decision even if it had not used an impermissible motive).
42. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 121 S. Ct. 924
(2001).
43. 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
44. Id. at 95.
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antitrust exemption45 and in discrimination cases. Although the Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA) was found guilty of discrimination
regarding female referees,4 6 MLB was able to escape liability in a similar
case.47 Therefore, it is hard to argue any likelihood of success, even if
the Orioles did have a clear policy not to hire Cuban defectors. And in
fact, none of the investigations into Orioles hiring practices found any
violations of the law.48
The clearest avenue of recourse against the Orioles would be through
Major League Baseball, which has had a good record recently of enforc-
ing behavior codes on its own teams. The Marge Schott and John
Rocker incidents are the best example of MLB policing itself to elimi-
nate discrimination. Schott had to give up control of the Cincinnati
Reds and Rocker was suspended for racist comments they each had
made.49 MLB's response to Representative Goodling, however, makes
it clear that MLB was not going to take any action against the Orioles at
that time. While confirming that baseball is indeed an "American insti-
tution," Commissioner Selig only promised an investigation,50 which ulti-
mately found no violation. In this controversy, the symbolism of
baseball was used to score political points.
II. FREE AGENCY VS. AMATEUR DRAFT FOR CUBAN PLAYERS
The second issue raised by the intersection of Cuba, the United
States, and baseball is less general in scope and less political in focus, but
perhaps far more important to the Cuban baseball community. This is-
sue also deals with the hiring of Cuban defectors and focuses on the
MLB rules for hiring individual players from Cuba once they arrive in
the United States.
45. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
46. Ortiz-Del Valle v. National Basketball Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
47. Postema v. National League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
48. O'Keeffe, supra note 31, at 71; Eric Fisher, Probe of Orioles Finds No Violations,
WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2001, at Bi.
49. Claire Smith, Baseball Bans Cincinnati Owner for a Year Over Racial Remarks, N.Y.
Tims, Feb. 4,1993, at Al; Murray Chass, Schott Agrees to Give Up Control of Cincinnati Reds
Through '98, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 1996, at Al; Murray Chass, Baseball Suspends Rocker Till
May for Comments, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al.
50. Letter from Allan H. (Bud) Selig, Commissioner, Major League Baseball, to Bill
Goodling, Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce (June 23, 2000) (on file
with author) ("I can assure you that as an employer and as an American institution, Major
League Baseball is committed to the goals of equal employment opportunity and diversity.").
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While Cuba has had a long history of baseball excellence,5 a the focus
on Cuban players is a relatively recent one. Cuban baseball players, as
opposed to other foreign players in the United States, must defect from
Cuba in order to play. The politics of defection, let alone the drama that
often accompanies the defection,52 sets these players apart from other
players in terms of how MLB treats them and how the United States
public views them.
In 1977, MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn set forth the Kuhn Direc-
tive in which he outlined Major League Baseball's position regarding
players from Cuba.53 The Kuhn Directive provided that United States
teams could not recruit from Cuba or negotiate with Cuban players who
were in Cuba. The Kuhn Directive was not really implicated until 1991
when a Cuban baseball player defected to the United States for the first
time since Fidel Castro took power in Cuba. 4 Over the course of the
next decade, player defections would become a regular event. With each
defection, MLB's handling of these players has continued to evolve.
MLB policy divides players into two groups for the purposes of
recruiting them for teams. Under Major League Rule 3, legal residents
of the United States or Canada can only enter into employment con-
tracts with a team after being subject to the amateur draft. In other
words, a United States resident can be a free agent only if he has been
passed over in the draft. On the other hand, foreign players may sign a
contract with a team without ever entering the draft.56
Cuban players, however, are not treated the same as other foreign
players. If a Cuban player is a resident of the United States, he must
proceed through the amateur draft and alert all teams as to his presence
in the United States. Only those Cuban players who establish residency
elsewhere (as in the cases of the two Hernandez brothers discussed be-
51. See generally ROBERTO GONZALEZ EC-EVARRfA, THE PRIDE OF HAVANA: A His-
TORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL (1999); Samuel 0. Regalado, "Latin Players on the Cheap:" Pro-
fessional Baseball Recruitment in Latin America and the Neocolonialist Tradition, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9 (2000).
52. Ira Berkow, Fulfilling Dreams of Freedom and Dollars: Joe Cubas Helps Cuban Ballp-
layers Defect, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at Bll; Timothy Smith, A Risk for Freedom and
Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at Cl; James C. McKinley, Jr., Cuban Players Defect, but
Often With a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, § 1, at 1.
53. Greller, supra note 6, at 1664 n.69.
54. Jason S. Weiss, The Changing Face of Baseball: In an Age of Globalization, is Baseball
Still as American as Apple Pie and Chevrolet?, 8 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L., 123, 136-37 (2000).
55. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit C, Viera v. Major League Base-




low) can become free agents. Furthermore, in order to establish this
residency according to MLB rules, the players must leave the United
States if they have already arrived here.57
Renee Arocha, who defected in 1991, started the parade of players to
the United States. When Arocha arrived, MLB held a special lottery
draft for him. This draft basically gave him free agency status and he was
able to negotiate with a variety of teams.58 In response to Arocha's de-
fection, which apparently was assisted by various sports agents, the Kuhn
Directive was strengthened to forbid all major league teams from dis-
cussing and negotiating with anyone in Cuba about signing a Cuban
baseball player.59
The next year, three more Cuban players made their way to the
United States. Alexis Cabreja, Osmani Estrada, and Ivan Alvarez all
defected to Mexico while the Cuban National Team was playing in Mex-
ico and then crossed the United States border illegally.6" Due to their
illegal entry into the United States, the Office of the Commissioner of
Major League Baseball declared that the three players would be treated
as immigrants arriving without appropriate documentation.61 The result
was that the players would be forced to enter the amateur draft rather
than be granted the effective free agency which had been given to
Arocha.62
In 1995, Cuban pitching star Livan Hernandez defected when the Cu-
ban National Team was in Mexico. On the advice of his agent, Joe
Cubas, Hernandez flew to Venezuela and then to the Dominican Repub-
lic where he was granted political asylum.63 Because of these geographic
and legal maneuvers, Hernandez was not considered a legal resident of
the United States. He was, therefore, permitted to enter MLB as a free
agent since he did not defect from Cuba directly to the United States. 64
The monetary rewards of free agency were quickly apparent as Livan
57. Id. at Exhibit D, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-27MAP).
58. Greller, supra note 6, at 1699-70 (1999). The St. Louis Cardinals won the rights to him
in the draft.
59. Weiss, supra note 54, at 137 n.62.
60. Id. at 138 n.67.
61. Id. at 138.
62. Id. at 139.
63. Id. at 143; Berkow, supra note 52, at 131.
64. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit D, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-
27MAP).
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signed with the Florida Marlins for a four-year contract at close to $4.5
million.65
Two years later, Livan's half-brother, Orlando Hernandez, was able
to enter MLB as a free agent through similar maneuvering. Although
Orlando's boat of Cuban refugees landed in the Bahamas and all on
board were interned, Orlando Hernandez was freed from the refugee
camp and permitted to establish residency in Costa Rica with the help of
sports agent Joe Cubas.66 Again, because Orlando was in Costa Rica
legally, he was able to enter the United States and MLB as a free agent
with the ensuing financial rewards. In 1998, he signed for $6.6 million
with the New York Yankees. 7
Although this pathway to the United States and to free agency
clearly benefited Orlando Hernandez, both the governments of the Ba-
hamas and Costa Rica responded negatively to his and his agent's ma-
neuvers. By 1996, the Bahamian government had already enacted a
repatriation agreement with Cuba that stated Cuba would be notified
about any Cuban refugees within seventy-two hours.6" While Her-
nandez was freed from the Bahamian detention center, the rest of the
Cuban refugees were not;69 even baseball players were being sent back
to Cuba.70 After the latter Hernandez defection, both the Bahamas and
Costa Rica began denying the majority of visa applications from Cuba
on the basis that their countries were being used merely as transit points
on the way to the United States.71
The primary development over the course of the 1990s was that the
best Cuban players and their agents learned how to circumvent MLB
rules placing Cuban defectors in the amateur draft so that these stars
could sign as free agents with the team of their choice for far more
money. At the same time, MLB was narrowing these loopholes, making
it more likely that Cuban players, in general, would face the draft.
Early in 2001, sports agent Joe Kehoskie tried to establish Dominican
Republic residency for two Cuban players, Mayque Quintero, and Evel
65. Berkow, supra note 52, at Bll.
66. Smith, supra note 52, at Cl; see also Claire Smith, Cuban Pitcher Gambles on a Major
League Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at C2.
67. Buster Olney, One Man's Journey to the Center of Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1998,
at Al.
68. Scott M. Cwiertny, Note, The Need for a Worldwide Draft: Major League Baseball
and its Relationship with the Cuban Embargo and United States Foreign Policy, 20 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L. REv. 391, 419 (2000).
69. Id. at 421.
70. Plus: Baseball: 4 Cuban Defectors are Sent Home, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at C5.
71. Cwiertny, supra note 68, at 420-21.
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Bastida who had also arrived here directly from Cuba. MLB ruled that
since the two players lived in Tampa, Florida, they were legal residents
subject to the draft. When Kehoskie argued that the players were legally
residents of the Dominican Republic, MLB further explained that immi-
gration law and baseball would not necessarily interpret the term "legal
resident" in the same way.72
With this incident as background, Cuban pitcher Rolando Viera de-
fected directly to the United States at the end of April 2001 and was
immediately granted refugee status on his visa. Under MLB rules, Viera
was subject to the draft. At the end of May, Viera's attorneys filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and emergency injunc-
tive relief, trying to prevent MLB from interfering with Viera's ability to
act as a free agent.73 His attorneys argued that Viera's choice of either
entering the draft or leaving the United States in order to establish resi-
dency elsewhere (and therefore jeopardizing his United States visa)
would cause irreparable harm.
Viera had two primary arguments as to why he would suffer irrepara-
ble harm. First, forcing him to enter the draft would likely result in him
receiving less money than he could receive through free agency. Fur-
thermore, Viera would be tied to a team for a certain amount of time
rather than have the ability to negotiate with a team of his choosing. If,
in the alternative, he were to leave the United States in order to avoid
the draft, Viera would potentially lose his "parolee" status on his visa
and have to jump several immigration hurdles in order to re-enter the
United States.74 The choice presented to Cuban players by MLB, Viera
argued, was discrimination on the basis of national origin.75 No other
foreign player faces the choice between directly entering and remaining
in the United States, and thus being subjected to the draft, or leaving the
72. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit D, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-
27MAP).
73. See generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motions
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-
27MAP).
74. Id. (according to his brief, Viera would have to leave the United States, obtain a li-
cense for United States employment, sign a contract in the other country, and then apply for a
work visa from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)).
75. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-27MAP). Viera based his case on Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin. He also
argued that MLB's actions violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
United States for a third country in order to establish foreign residency,
and thus not being subjected to the draft.
Major League Baseball filed an opposition to the temporary re-
straining order, arguing that the standard for injunctive relief had not
been met.76 The court agreed.77 Both the MLB brief and the Order
focused on the technical aspects of the standard for the TRO rather than
the broader question of whether MLB is engaged in discrimination. The
order denying the TRO stated that Viera should have filed a complaint
with the EEOC as required by Title VII.78 Furthermore, the order
agreed with the MLB argument that entering the draft was not irrepara-
ble harm because any damage suffered by Viera would be monetary and,
therefore, could be remedied at a later date.79 The choice that Viera had
to make between leaving the country or joining the draft, the court held,
was "speculative" rather than "actual and imminent."8 The TRO was
denied on these procedural grounds rather than upholding the legitimacy
of MLB rules. Viera has since filed for partial summary judgment
against MLB.8 1 A ruling from' the court is pending.
The issue of the legality and fairness of the MLB rules is really the far
more interesting point that will be dealt with as the case progresses
through the courts. Viera's arguments are compelling when compared to
the situations of other foreign-born players. None of the recently-ar-
rived Japanese stars signed by MLB teams were forced to go through the
draft. 2 These players were free to come to the United States, be
scouted, negotiate for their contracts in the United States, and then re-
side here.
If Cuban players were treated like other foreign players, they would
have to apply for special work visas after signing with a team. Because,
however, Cubans are immediately granted refugee status, MLB argues
that at the moment when Cuban players come to the United States, they
76. Support Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at
2, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-27MAP). The standard for the Eleventh Circuit is set forth in
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing American
Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir. 1998)).
77. Order of Court, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-27MAP).
78. Id. at 5-6.
79. Id. at 10-11.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-27MAP).
82. Mark Bechtel, Rising Sons, With Timely Hitting and Superb Defense, the Mariners'
Ichiro Suzuki and the Mets' Tsuyoshi Shinjo are Boosting the Stock of Asian Players, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 23, 2001, at 36; Jack Curry, Mets Importing Charisma and Defense From
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at D3.
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establish legal residency.8 3 The irony is that the same immigration policy
which benefits other Cubans by granting them refugee status, harms the
Cuban players.
MLB argues that it is not discriminating on the basis of national ori-
gin-the rules are the same for any player that establishes residency
here. However, MLB has not been able to point to any other examples
of foreign players facing the same choice as Cuban players. MLB also
argues that the Hernandez brothers were able to enter into free agency
because they established residency elsewhere first, apparently endorsing
this method of avoiding the draft. Yet, MLB's argument is specious. To
treat players differently because of where their boat landed when they
defected is the height of arbitrary and disparate treatment. The goal-to
live and play in the United States-is the same for all of these Cuban
players.
Il. FuTupI IMPLICATIONS
Both sports enthusiasts and Congress have proposed interesting ideas
for dealing with Cuba and baseball. Potential responses to the Cuban
dilemma include the proposed Baseball Diplomacy Act (BDA)8 4 or
other legislation 5 that would allow Cuban players to return home, to
send money back to Cuba, and would otherwise lift some of the most
onerous restrictions on immigration and trade. 6
The threatened enforcement actions against the Orioles have gone
nowhere. At the same time, there have been no more games or ex-
changes between the Cuban National Team and the Baltimore Orioles.
The most interesting consequence of the entire Orioles controversy is
what it highlights about baseball, United States foreign policy, and
greed. While the exchange started out as a sports and public relations
83. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit D, Viera (No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-
27MAP); see also Thorn Loverro, O's Can Avoid Discrimination Charge by Signing Morales,
WASH. TIMFs, Aug. 5, 2000, at C1 (describing Cuban pitcher Andy Morales' quest to come to
the United States, one writer called United States' policy the "Gilligan policy" because
Morales was allowed to stay in the United States on his second try at defection because he
made land).
84. Baseball Diplomacy Act, H.R. 262, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (calling for modifications
to the United States embargo to permit Cuban baseball players to compete in Major League
Baseball).
85. H.R. 9, 105th Cong. § 1(a)(1) (1997) (providing the original language of Serrano's
legislation); Congressman Jose E. Serrano, Serrano's Bill Would Open Doors WI Cuba
Through Sports, NEws RELEASE, Nov. 5, 1997.
86. Greller, supra note 6, at 1669-71.
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opportunity, we must recognize that any interaction with Cuba is fraught
with potential landmines. At first, Peter Angelos was accused of going
to Cuba in order to recruit more Cuban players for his own team. Other
owners were worried that the Orioles would have an advantage in
recruiting talented Cuban players. After Thrift's alleged statement, the
Orioles were then accused of cozying up to dictators. The last remnant
of the Cold War was being fought by baseball owners and politicians all
located in the United States.
Politicians, however, have not weighed in on the individual rights of
Cuban players. Where is the political furor regarding Viera's unfair situ-
ation? When the enemy is MLB itself rather than Castro or a DNC ac-
tivist, these voices fall silent. The Viera controversy questions the heart
of MLB by attacking the rules on free agency. Is MLB using the Cuban
embargo to its benefit by denying Cuban players the same rights as other
foreign players? Are the rules on residency legitimate or an insidious
technicality?
Baseball purists might regret the interference of politics and baseball.
After all, don't we all just want to watch a good game of baseball played
by the most talented players available? A clear awareness of the actors
in the political drama and the players in the baseball drama regarding
Cuba make it obvious that baseball is not just a game when one of the
players is Cuban.
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